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Abstract

In its approach to defining “analogous grounds” for the purposes of subsection 15(1) of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted an unusual mix of broad and generous
interpretation, and high formalism. This article argues that one potential reason for this is the degree of
heterogeneity among the nine distinct enumerated grounds in section 15. Heterogeneity of this kind can
produce quite different interpretive consequences, depending on whether a court adopts a direct, “multipronged,” or a more synthetic, “common denominator,” approach to the question of analogical development.
The Court, over time, has implicitly shifted from the first to the second of these approaches. For comparative
constitutional scholars, a lesson of Canadian Charter jurisprudence is thus that the number and scope of the
analogical baseline categories in a constitution—and how courts approach their relationship to each
other—can matter a great deal for the subsequent recognition of new constitutional categories. For those
seeking to design broad constitutional guarantees of equality, or other provisions containing express
analogical baselines, the lesson is potentially even more specific: More may not always be better when it
comes to encouraging judges to give effect to a preferred constitutional understanding.
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The Supreme Court Of Canada And
Constitutional (Equality) Baselines
ROSALIND DIXON *
In its approach to defining “analogous grounds” for the purposes of subsection 15(1) of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted an unusual
mix of broad and generous interpretation, and high formalism. This article argues that one
potential reason for this is the degree of heterogeneity among the nine distinct enumerated
grounds in section 15. Heterogeneity of this kind can produce quite different interpretive
consequences, depending on whether a court adopts a direct, “multi-pronged,” or a more
synthetic, “common denominator,” approach to the question of analogical development. The
Court, over time, has implicitly shifted from the first to the second of these approaches.
For comparative constitutional scholars, a lesson of Canadian Charter jurisprudence is thus
that the number and scope of the analogical baseline categories in a constitution—and how
courts approach their relationship to each other—can matter a great deal for the subsequent
recognition of new constitutional categories. For those seeking to design broad constitutional guarantees of equality, or other provisions containing express analogical baselines,
the lesson is potentially even more specific: More may not always be better when it comes to
encouraging judges to give effect to a preferred constitutional understanding.
Dans son approche visant à définir les « motifs analogues » aux fins du paragraphe 15(1) de
la Charte des droits et libertés, la Cour suprême du Canada a opté pour un mélange inhabituel
d’interprétation vaste et généreuse et de formalisme élevé. Cet article fait valoir qu’une
raison potentielle en est le degré d’hétérogénéité parmi les neuf motifs distincts énumérés à
l’article 15. Une telle hétérogénéité peut amener à des interprétations fort différentes selon
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qu’un tribunal adopte une approche directe « concertée » ou une approche plus synthétique
de « dénominateur commun » quant à la question du développement analogique. Avec le
temps, la Cour, a implicitement glissé de la première à la deuxième de ces approches. Pour
les chercheurs en constitutions comparées, la jurisprudence de la Charte canadienne nous
apprend donc que le nombre et la portée des catégories analogiques de départ dans une
constitution – et la façon dont les tribunaux abordent leurs relations les uns avec les autres
– peuvent s’avérer essentiels pour la reconnaissance ultérieure de nouvelles catégories
constitutionnelles. Pour ceux qui cherchent à concevoir de larges garanties constitutionnelles
d’égalité ou d’autres dispositions renfermant des bases analogiques expresses, la leçon peut
se préciser davantage : plus n’est pas toujours mieux lorsqu’il s’agit d’inciter les juges à
appliquer une manière privilégiée d’interpréter la constitution.
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IN INTERPRETING SUBSECTION 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and

Freedoms over the last nearly thirty years,1 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
has developed ideas about equality and non-discrimination that have attracted
a remarkable global audience.2 In contrast, the SCC’s “analogous grounds”
jurisprudence—that is, its approach to determining whether various grounds of
discrimination are analogous to those explicitly enumerated in subsection 15(1)
has received far less attention from comparative constitutional scholars.3
This article attempts to fill this gap in comparative constitutional scholarship
by considering the broader lessons for comparative constitutional lawyers of the
1.

2.
3.

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11. Unlike other provisions of the Charter that came into effect in 1982, the implementation
of s 15 was delayed until 1985.
See e.g. Adam Dodek, “Canada as Constitutional Exporter: The Rise of the ‘Canadian
Model’ of Constitutionalism” (2007) 36 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 309
The SCC’s approach has had some influence on foreign courts. See e.g. Larbi-Odam v
Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) and another, (1997)
12 B Const LR 1655 at para 19, [1998] 1 S Afr LR 745 (Const Ct). However, that
influence has also clearly been far less significant than in the context of other aspects of the
Court’s approach to s 15. See e.g. Judge DM Davis, “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland
Jurisprudence” (1999) 116 SALJ 398 at 404 (on the borrowing of the SCC’s dignity-based
approach). However, that influence has also clearly been far less significant than in the
context of other aspects of the Court’s approach to s 15: see e.g. Davis, (ibid) at 404 (on the
borrowing of the SCC’s dignity-based approach).
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SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence and, in particular, the lessons it offers
for ongoing debates in other countries about constitutional design, amendment,
or both.
The SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence has been characterized, this
article suggests, by two general features: first, a broad and generous approach
to recognizing various grounds as analogous; and second, a surprising degree of
formalism at the level of constitutional reasoning. The SCC has consistently recognized
citizenship, marital status, and sexual orientation as analogous grounds, despite
significant disagreement among the framers of the Charter over these grounds,
and despite the reluctance of other courts, such as the US Supreme Court, to
apply heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause4 in these contexts.
The SCC has also recognized certain “embedded” or intersecting grounds (such
as off-reserve Aboriginal status) as either within, or analogous to, those grounds
enumerated in subsection 15(1). Additionally, the SCC has left open the possibility
of recognizing certain other grounds on a more contextual, case-by-case basis.
Increasingly, however, the test endorsed by the SCC for determining
whether a particular ground is analogous for the purpose of subsection 15(1)
has been surprisingly formalistic, namely, a test of whether a particular personal
characteristic is “immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal
identity” (an immutability test).5 In endorsing such a test, the SCC has largely
failed to explain how either actual or “constructive” immutability6 relates to three
broad underlying notions of equality to which it seeks to give effect under
subsection 15(1): a commitment to anti-stereotyping, anti-subordination, and
human dignity. The criterion of actual immutability, this article argues, bears
little obvious relationship to any of the three underlying conceptions of equality.
The idea of constructive immutability is likewise largely a normative conclusion
rather than an independent test for whether a particular distinction offends these
values.7

4.
5.
6.

7.

US Const amend XIV, § 1.
Corbière v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 13,
173 DLR (4th) 1, McLachlin & Bastarache JJ [Corbière].
The term “constructive immutability” is used here as shorthand for the SCC’s notion that
some personal characteristics are changeable “only at unacceptable personal cost.” See
e.g. Corbière, supra note 5 at para 60. The label is imperfect, because as Part II notes, the
animating concern here is about human dignity, rather than the fixed or changeable nature of
a characteristic. The language, however, tracks the SCC’s own formulation in this context.
Cf. Dale Gibson, “Analogous Grounds of Discrimination Under the Canadian Charter: Too
Much Ado about Next to Nothing” (1991) 29:4 Alta L Rev 772; Wojciech Sadurski, Equality
and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

640

(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Part of the aim of this article, therefore, is to attempt to explain this surprising
combination of broad and generous interpretation with high formalism on the
part of the SCC by linking it to the number and scope of enumerated analogical
baselines in subsection 15(1). There is, the article suggests, significant heterogeneity
of grounds in subsection 15(1).8 Several enumerated grounds touch on characteristics
that are almost never morally or practically relevant for governments except in a
remedial context (e.g., race, national and ethnic origin, and colour). Others involve
characteristics that may be more frequently relevant, at least in the context of
certain purportedly real physical differences (e.g., sex and physical disability),
or for the purposes of appropriate government support or accommodation (e.g.,
sex, religion and disability). Others are based on characteristics that are more
pervasively relevant (e.g., age). Further, while most grounds are expressed in
symmetric terms (e.g., race, national and ethnic origin, colour, sex, and age),
some (i.e., mental and physical disability) are expressed in more asymmetric,
disadvantage-focused terms.
In the face of such heterogeneity, it matters a great deal how courts seek
to analogize from existing constitutional baselines. Courts, the article suggests,
have a choice in this context between at least two general approaches: one that
allows direct analogies to be drawn between a new constitutional claim and one
or more existing constitutional categories or sub-groups of categories (a “direct”
or “multi-pronged approach”); and another that, first, requires consideration of
what the existing constitutional categories have in common, and only then
considers whether a new constitutional category shares those features (a “synthetic”
or “common denominator” approach). The two approaches will lead to quite
different interpretive responses by courts to heterogeneous grounds.
Under a multi-pronged approach, the heterogeneous grounds will tend to
lead to an expansive approach by courts to recognizing new constitutional claims
as analogous; the greater the number of diverse categories recognized by a
constitution, the greater the likelihood that a new category will share something
in common with at least one of those categories. Under a more synthetic,
common denominator approach, in contrast, the same heterogeneity is likely
to lead to greater abstraction in the level at which courts construe the criteria
for recognizing new constitutional categories as analogous. Abstract criteria of
this kind will also often have little connection to underlying substantive
constitutional concerns or commitments, and thus lead to a distinctly formalist
approach.
8.

Compare e.g. Robert Leckey, “Chosen Discrimination” (2002) 18 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 445 at
446, 448-54.
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Support for this proposition can be found in a broader comparative context,
but is also the central lesson of the SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence under
subsection 15(1). In almost all of the early cases recognizing new grounds as
analogous, the SCC or lower courts adopted some version of a multi-pronged
approach: They either employed tests that relied on an implicit analogy to only
some of the enumerated grounds in subsection 15(1), or used a multi-factorial
test that relied on shared characteristics of sub-groups of enumerated grounds. In
more recent cases, however, the SCC has been more formalistic in its reasoning
and has shifted towards a more synthetic, common denominator approach. This
shift, the article suggests, has potentially important implications for debates in
other jurisdictions about the relevance of amendments to a constitution’s equality
clause and for debates over the design of such clauses more generally.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets out the major decisions of the
SCC recognizing new grounds of discrimination as analogous for the purposes of
section 15, and explains how such cases contributed to a pattern of broad
and generous interpretation on the part of the SCC. Part II contrasts this
interpretive approach with a pattern of increasingly formalist reasoning on the
part of the SCC in this same context and with the increasingly narrow application of
such formalist reasoning by provincial courts in cases involving certain kinds
of economic- or poverty-based claims to substantive equality. Part III connects
the patterns in Parts I and II to the two potential approaches by courts to the
analogical baselines in a constitution, and shows how one approach (the
multi-pronged approach) helps explain the SCC’s generous approach, while
the second (the synthetic approach) explains its formalism. Part IV concludes
by considering the importance of these Canadian lessons for ongoing debates
among American constitutional scholars about the relevance, or irrelevance, of
proposed constitutional amendments such as the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment,
and for the design and redesign of constitutional baselines more generally.9

I. A BROAD APPROACH TO ANALOGOUS GROUNDS
In interpreting the Charter’s guarantee of equality, the SCC has generally taken a
broad approach to recognizing various grounds of discrimination as analogous to
those enumerated in subsection 15(1).
Subsection 15(1) explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of nine
listed, or “enumerated,” grounds: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,

9.

HRJ Res 208, 92d Cong, 2d Sess, 86 Stat 1523 [ERA].
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sex, age, and mental or physical disability.10 By recognizing various grounds as
analogous to these express grounds, the SCC has extended this list to include
discrimination based on citizenship, marital status, sexual orientation, and
off-reserve Aboriginal status.
In Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,11 for example, the SCC considered
a challenge under subsection 15(1) to provisions of the British Columbia Barristers
and Solicitors Act limiting admission as a solicitor in the province to Canadian
citizens. While dividing on the issue of reasonableness under section 1 of the
Charter, the SCC was unanimous in upholding the validity of the plaintiff’s claim
of discrimination based on an analogous ground. Non-citizens who were lawful
permanent residents of Canada, Justice McIyntre held, were a “discrete and insular
minority” of the kind within the protection of section 15.12 Indeed, citizenship
more generally was held, according to Justice La Forest, to be a ground “similar
to those enumerated in s. 15.”13
In Miron v Trudel,14 the SCC considered an equality challenge by parties to
a heterosexual common law relationship to provisions of the Ontario Insurance Act
requiring insurers to provide benefits to the (legal) spouse of a person killed or injured
in an auto accident. In upholding the challenge, the SCC explicitly recognized marital
status, and in particular non-married status, as a ground analogous to those in
subsection 15(1). Four justices in the majority held that “the characteristic of
being unmarried—of not having contracted a marriage in a manner recognized by
the state—constitutes a ground of discrimination within the ambit of s. 15(1).”15
The remaining justices were also willing to recognize that distinctions based on
marital status, or between marriage and “relationships analogous to marriage,”
may violate subsection 15(1) in at least some cases: Four dissenting justices held
that marital status is an analogous ground at least in contexts where the particular laws under challenge did not seek to define marriage itself, or its rights and

10. The word “enumerated” is, of course, somewhat misleading in this context, given that the
list of grounds is open-ended. The term, however, is the prevailing one used to describe the
express grounds of prohibited discrimination in s 15(1).
11. [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews cited to SCR].
12. Ibid at para 31. The description of non-citizens in these terms is not necessarily descriptively
accurate, given that non-citizens are often quite strongly integrated into the social and
economic community of a country. However, the term is often used as shorthand for a
concern about the political powerlessness of such groups, in terms of their inability to vote
and their limited success in forming broader political coalitions.
13. Ibid at para 75.
14. [1995] 2 SCR 418, 124 DLR (4th) 693 [Miron cited to SCR].
15. Ibid at para 150, McLachlin J with Sopinka, Cory, & Iacobucci JJ concurring.
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obligations;16 and in her concurring judgment, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé suggested that such distinctions were frequently, though not always, a violation of
section 15.17
In Egan v Canada,18 the SCC considered a challenge to provisions of the
Old Age Security Act19 providing for the payment of a statutory allowance to the
“spouse” of a person receiving a pension under the Act whose income fell below
a certain level, but not the same-sex partner of a pensioner in the same
position. While a majority of the SCC ultimately rejected the claim and found
that the relevant discrimination was justified under section 1, the SCC was again
unanimous in accepting the claim of prima facie discrimination under subsection
15(1). This, as Justice La Forest noted, also clearly meant accepting the concession by
the Attorney General of Canada that sexual orientation is an analogous ground
for the purposes of subsection 15(1).20 In upholding a similar subsection 15(1)
challenge to the scope of provincial human rights legislation in Vriend v Alberta,21
the SCC again affirmed that sexual orientation is “analogous to the other
personal characteristics enumerated in s. 15(1)” and thus the failure to protect
the plaintiff against dismissal from employment based on his sexual orientation
violated subsection 15(1).22
The “generosity” of this approach is particularly clear when viewed in a
broader historical and comparative context. One of the key issues surrounding
the drafting of subsection 15(1), for example, was whether it would include sexual
orientation as an enumerated ground.23 Feminist groups in particular argued for
the inclusion of marital status as an enumerated ground, but were defeated by
those who favoured a more limited equality guarantee.24 In fact, the very concept

16. Ibid at para 26, Gonthier J with Lamer CJ, La Forest & Major JJ dissenting.
17. See ibid at para 91 (eschewing over-reliance on the idea of analogous grounds, but endorsing
reasoning of a similar kind as part of a contextual analysis of the nature of the group affected
by the law).
18. [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609 [Egan cited to SCR].
19. RSC 1985, c O-9.
20. Ibid at para 5.
21. [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385 [Vriend cited to SCR].
22. Ibid at para 90, Cory and Iacobucci JJ.
23. See Mary Eberts, “Section 15: The Next Twenty Years” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 47 at 48;
Douglas Elliott, “Secrets of the Lavender Mafia: Personal Reflections on Social Activism and
the Charter” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 97 at 105.
24. See Doris Anderson, “The Adoption of Section 15: Origins and Aspirations” (2006) 5:1 JL
& Equality 39 at 41. See generally Hon Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “It Takes a Vision: The
Constitutionalization of Equality in Canada” (2002) 14:2 Yale JL & Feminism 363 at 36667 (regarding the influence of women’s groups on the drafting of s 15).
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of subsection 15(1) as an analogical baseline, or non-exhaustive list of prohibited
grounds, emerged out of this controversy as a compromise between those who
favoured an expansive definition of equality in the context of sexual orientation
and family status and those who favoured a limited or conservative one.25
In the United States, courts have been far more reluctant to recognize grounds
such as sexual orientation as “analogous” to race for the purpose of heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In Romer v Evans,26 for example, the
Supreme Court of the United States ultimately struck down an attempt by the
state of Colorado (by popular initiative) to prevent the adoption of anti-discrimination
laws designed to protect gay and lesbian individuals. However, in doing so, the
Court relied almost entirely on the fact that the law in question showed clear
animus toward gay and lesbian people and imposed a highly unusual restriction
on access to the (benefits) of the political process. It did not suggest that distinctions
based on sexual orientation were analogous to race or other quasi-suspect
classifications in deserving heightened scrutiny. On the contrary, Justice Kennedy
suggested, for the majority, that the Court was simply applying an ordinary form
of rational basis review.27
In Canada, the SCC has also been willing to recognize certain “embedded,”
or intersectional, grounds of discrimination as analogous for the purposes of subsection
15(1). In Corbière,28 for example, the SCC was asked to find discrimination
contrary to subsection 15(1) in various provisions of the Indian Act 29 restricting
the right to vote in Aboriginal band elections to those living on a reserve. In
upholding the challenge, the SCC held that although the grounds of “Aboriginal
residenc[y]” or “off-reserve status” could only apply to a “subset of the population,”
this was no bar to their recognition as analogous grounds. “Embedded analogous
grounds,” it held, were sometimes necessary to “permit meaningful consideration
of intra-group discrimination.”30
Likewise, in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)31 the
SCC considered a challenge to provisions of the Canada Pension Plan that denied
a death benefit to individuals who, at the time of their spouse’s death, were under
25. Elliott, supra note 23 at 105; Eberts, supra note 23 at 48.
26. 517 US 620 (1996), 116 S Ct 1620 [Romer cited to US].
27. Ibid at 631-32 (noting that the Court avoids unduly broad review on the Equal Protection
Clause by applying rational basis review wherever a law “neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class”).
28. Supra note 5.
29. RSC 1985, c I-5.
30. Ibid at paras 14-15, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.
31. [1999] 1 SCR 497, 170 DLR (4th) 1 [Law cited to SCR].
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thirty and did not have children or a relevant disability. Justice Iacobucci held
that if the relevant pension plan did not discriminate on age alone, it could be
seen as discriminating on a “combination,” or “confluence,” of grounds that was
itself analogous to the distinct enumerated grounds in subsection 15(1).32
In rejecting such grounds as provincial residency and membership in the
armed forces as analogous for the purposes of subsection 15(1), the SCC has
nonetheless left open the possibility that these grounds might be treated as
analogous in the future. In R v Turpin,33 for example, the SCC rejected the status
of persons charged with murder outside of Alberta as an analogous ground for the
purposes of subsection 15(1). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Wilson clarified
that she was not suggesting that “a person’s province of residence or place of trial
could not in some circumstances be a personal characteristic of the individual or
group capable of constituting a[n analogous] ground of discrimination.”34 Similarly,
in R v Généreux,35 in rejecting the subsection 15(1) claim of a member of the
armed services facing trial by court martial for possession of narcotics, the SCC
held that it was not suggesting “that military personnel can never be the objects
of disadvantage or discrimination in a manner that could bring them [as a class]
within” the scope of subsection 15(1), or make them a class of persons analogous to
those enumerated in subsection 15(1).36
This, of course, is not to say that the SCC could not have been more
generous in its approach to subsection 15(1) in these or other contexts.37 Justice
32. Ibid at paras 93-94.
33. [1989] 1 SCR 1296, 96 NR 115 [Turpin cited to SCR].
34. Ibid at para 53. See also ibid at para 52. Among the “indicia of discrimination,” Justice
Wilson cited “stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social
prejudice”[emphasis added]. This in part reflects a concern about the need to ensure a
forward- and backward-looking approach to disadvantage, but also introduces some analytic
blurring of categories.
35. [1992] 1 SCR 259, 88 DLR (4th) 110 [Généreux cited to SCR].
36. Ibid at para 104, Lamer CJ [emphasis in original].
37. For criticisms of the SCC’s approach to s 15(1) as overly focused on the comparator group
requirement, see e.g. Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme
Court of Canada Dooms Section 15” (2006) 24:1 Windsor YB Access Just 111; Sophia Reibetanz
Moreau, “Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality
81. The SCC has also been criticized for placing too much weight on internal limitations under
s 15(1), as opposed to a more general limitation approach under s 1. See e.g. Peter W Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada 2d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 800-801 (advocating the
latter approach). See generally Leon E Trakman, “Section 15: Equality? Where?” (1995) 6:4
Constitutional Forum 112. Others suggest that the SCC has a mixed record in this context. See
e.g. Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C Faria & Emily Lawrence, “What’s Law Good For? An Empirical
Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 Sup Ct L R (2d) 103.
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L’Heureux-Dubé, for example, undoubtedly took a more expansive approach to
the analogous grounds requirement under subsection 15(1) than did most other
justices, in that she adopted a more direct and contextualized focus on the
nature of the group affected by a particular distinction.38 In doing so, however,
she clearly went beyond simply extending the analogous grounds requirement so
as to give it a more generous, dignity-based reading, but explicitly abandoned the
analogous grounds requirement as part of the subsection 15(1) analysis.39
In general, therefore, it seems fair to say that the SCC’s approach to the
recognition of analogous grounds has accorded with its more general commitment
under subsection 15(1) to “a broad and generous approach” to enforcing the
Charter’s guarantee of equality.40

II. SURPRISING FORMALISM
Yet, over time, in its reasoning on the scope of analogous grounds, the SCC has
shifted towards a surprisingly formalist approach that has little clear connection
to questions of substance or to any underlying substantive theory, or understanding,
of equality endorsed by the SCC itself.41
Three broad underlying understandings of equality emerge in the SCC’s case
law on subsection 15(1): (i) the idea of equality as treatment based on individual
merit and characteristics, rather than stereotypical assumptions or prejudices
(anti-stereotyping); (ii) the idea of equality as equal standing and access to political
and economic resources and opportunities for all groups, thus giving rise to a
situation in which no group is systematically disadvantaged or subordinated by,
or when compared to, another (anti-subordination); and (iii) the idea of equality
as a commitment to equal concern and respect for all citizens (equal dignity).42
38. See e.g. Miron, supra note 14; Corbière, supra note 5. For praise of this approach as better
realizing the ideal of substantive equality, see Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking
Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48:4 McGill LJ 627; Daphne Gilbert, “Unequalled:
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé’s Vision of Equality and Section 15 of the Charter” (2003)
15:1 CJWL 1.
39. See e.g. Gibson, supra note 7.
40. See e.g. Andrews, supra note 11 at para 64, Wilson J.
41. My criticism of the SCC as “formalist” in this context is thus largely in the mode, or spirit, of
immanent critique, rather than any independent idea about the most desirable level of abstraction
versus specificity, or generality versus attention to context, in constitutional reasoning.
42. In addition to these three understandings, scholars have also advanced a number of further
distinctive approaches to the scope of s 15(1). See e.g. Hugh Collins, “Discrimination,
Equality and Social Inclusion” (2003) 66 Mod L Rev 16 (for a theory based on social
exclusion); Donna Greschner, “The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights” (2002) 6:2
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When he endorsed a three-stage approach to discrimination under
subsection 15(1) in Andrews, Justice McIntyre recognized the centrality of
questions of “stereotyping” and “historical disadvantage” or “prejudice.”43
Justice Wilson, in her concurring judgment, gave even greater emphasis to
concerns about historical disadvantage, or subordination, suggesting that a
key purpose of section 15 was to ensure that in drawing distinctions between
individuals, governments did not “bring about or reinforce the disadvantage
of certain groups.”44
When it affirmed and refined this three-stage approach in Law,45 the SCC
explicitly emphasized concerns about both stereotyping and subordination.46
An “important, but not exclusive” purpose of subsection 15(1), the SCC
suggested, is “the protection of individuals and groups who are vulnerable,
disadvantaged, or members of ‘discrete and insular minorities,’” or “a guarantee
against the evil of [group-based] oppression.”47 The SCC also emphasized,
however, that subsection 15(1) protects individuals, not just groups, from
“stereotyping, or political or social prejudice.”48 Human dignity, it suggested,
is a value that underpins both these commitments, as well as the Charter
guarantee of equality more generally. The idea of human dignity entails a
society in which “all persons enjoy equal recognition … as members of Canadian
society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration”;
Section 15 prohibits both “unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits” of individuals,
and also prohibits distinctions that mean that individuals or groups are “marginalized,
ignored, or devalued.”49

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Rev Const Stud 291 (for a theory based on social diversity); Rahool Parkash Agarwal, “An
Autonomy-based Approach to Subsection 15(1) of the Charter” (2006) 12:1 Rev Const Stud
83 (for a theory based on autonomy); Moreau, supra note 37 (for a theory based on norms of
fair treatment).
Supra note 11 at paras 41-43, citing Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Canada
(Attorney General), 34 DLR (4th) 584 at para 16, 78 NR 30 (FCA).
Andrews, ibid at para 5.
See e.g. Emily Grabham, “Law v Canada: New Directions for Equality under the Canadian
Charter?” (2002) 22:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 641.
Supra note 31 at para 64, Iacobucci J.
Ibid at paras 68, 42, Iacobucci J.
Ibid at para 51, Iacobucci J.
Ibid at para 53, Iacobucci J. See e.g. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 24 (for further development
of the dignity-based vision of s 15(1)).
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In R v Kapp, the SCC once again refined this test so as to reduce the role
played by the four-stage contextual analysis developed in Law, and Law’s
emphasis on human dignity as a freestanding test for discrimination.50 However,
in doing so, the SCC again affirmed the idea of discrimination as involving either
the perpetuation of “disadvantage” or “stereotyping” and the relevance of human
dignity as a value underpinning these commitments.51
Increasingly, however, the SCC has moved towards a test of immutability
or constructive immutability for determining whether particular grounds are
analogous for subsection 15(1) purposes—a test that has little clear connection
to any of these three underlying understandings of equality.
Initially, in Andrews, the question of immutability was only one of several
factors considered by Justice La Forest in determining whether citizenship, or
non-citizen status, was analogous for the purposes of subsection 15(1).52 His reasons
also evinced a concern with equality as anti-subordination: “Non-citizens,” he
suggested, are “an example without parallel of a group who are relatively powerless
politically, and whose interests are likely to be compromised by legislative
decisions,” and further, against whom there is a long history of discrimination,
including in the employment context.53 Justice Wilson in particular went even
further in stressing a concern about anti-subordination, suggesting that what was
relevant to the status of citizenship as an analogous ground was that non-citizens
“are a group lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to having their
interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated.”54
Likewise, in Miron, in recognizing marital status as an analogous ground,
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) gave limited weight to immutability as a
relevant criterion, simply noting that it had been suggested that “distinctions
based on personal and immutable characteristics” are discriminatory “by
extension” of the logic that “[d]istinctions based on personal characteristics,
attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will
rarely escape the charge of discrimination.”55 Far more central to her reasoning
was a focus on a concern for human dignity in general, and anti-stereotyping in
50. 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp cited to SCC]. For a discussion, see Sophia Moreau,
“R v Kapp: New Directions for Section 15” (2008-2009) 40:2 Ottawa L Rev 283.
51. Ibid at paras 16-25, McLachlin CJ & Abella J.
52. Supra note 11 at paras 67-68.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid at para 5.
55. Supra note 14 at para 148, citing Andrews, Sopinka, Cory & Iacobucci JJ concurring.
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particular. Namely, the “unifying principle” behind all prior analogous grounds
jurisprudence was
the avoidance of stereotypical reasoning and the creation of legal distinctions which
violate the dignity and freedom of the individual, on the basis of some preconceived
perception about the attributed characteristics of a group rather than the true capacity,
worth or circumstances of the individual.56

In Egan, however, several members of the SCC began to shift towards
a much more exclusive reliance on an immutability test.57 Justice La Forest
suggested (on behalf of four justices) that the concession by the Attorney
General that sexual orientation is an analogous ground for the purposes of
subsection 15(1) was proper because sexual orientation is “a deeply personal
characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable
personal costs.” He gave no further explanation for why this test was determinative,
or for why it took precedence over other factors.58
In Corbière, in 1999, the SCC moved even more clearly to endorse
immutability—or constructive immutability—as more or less the sole
determinant of whether a ground is analogous for the purposes of subsection
15(1). This paralleled a broader shift by the SCC in Law toward a more
tightly structured, unified approach to subsection 15(1).59 Thus, the SCC
suggested in Corbière that what the enumerated grounds have in common is
that they “often serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the
basis of merit but on the basis of a personal characteristic that is immutable
or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity;” on this basis,
the SCC held that “the thrust of identification of analogous grounds” is that
they are “based on characteristics that we cannot change or that the government
56. Ibid at para 149, 496–97 McLachlin J (Sopinka, Cory & Iacobucci JJ concurring).
57. But see Egan, supra note 18 at paras 150-59, 171, Cory & Iacobucci JJ (continuing to
apply a more multi-factor, substantive test, with a clear focus on the underlying question of
whether a group claiming analogous ground status had “suffered discrimination arising from
stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice”).
58. Ibid at para 5. See also Vriend, supra note 21 at para 90, Cory & Iacobucci JJ (citing Egan
and affirming this finding, the SCC again gave prominence to immutability as one of the key
factors to be considered).
59. For the connection between a synthetic approach and a more structured, analytic approach
in this context, see e.g. Martha C Nussbaum, “Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities:
‘Perception’ against Lofty Formalism” (2007) 121:1 Harvard L Rev 4 (criticizing certain
aspects of the US Supreme Court’s approach as “lofty” and formalist). See also Majury, supra
note 37 (criticizing certain aspects of the SCC’s early equality jurisprudence for insufficient
attention to context and substantive notions of equality).
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has no legitimate interest in expecting us to change to receive equal treatment
under the law.”60
The SCC, however, did not explain what, if any, connection it saw between
this criterion of immutability, or constructive immutability, and the more
substantive values underpinning subsection 15(1).61 There is, this article argues,
at best only a very weak, indirect connection between such a test and the three
understandings of equality endorsed by the SCC in the application of the other
limbs of subsection 15(1).62
From an anti-stereotyping perspective, for example, the most reliable
indicator of suspect decision making will be the reliance on individual
characteristics that have no (presumptive) moral or practical relevance. This was
the vision of analogous grounds endorsed by Justice Gonthier, on behalf of four
justices, in Miron; the key purpose of subsection 15(1), Justice Gonthier suggested,
was to prevent stereotyping, or reliance on irrelevant distinctions, by the government.63
This, for Justice Gonthier, meant that “[r]elevancy is also at the heart of the
identification of an analogous ground.”64
In most cases, immutability will also be a poor proxy for moral or practical
relevance of this kind. Age, for example, while always changing, is also a morally
relevant or legitimate basis on which the government may draw certain distinctions,
including distinctions about the degree to which individuals can exercise informed
60. Supra note 5 at para 13, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.
61. See e.g. ibid at para 13, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ (suggesting some connection between
the immutability test and all three understandings of equality, or that immutable personal
characteristics are often the basis of “stereotypical” or “illegitimate and demeaning proxies
for merit-based decision making,” or that concerns about historical disadvantage, or political
powerlessness “could also be seen to flow from the central concept of immutability,” but
providing no further explanation for how, or why, this is the case).
62. Perhaps the most promising defence of such a criterion is that it helps to direct attention
to individual choice or autonomy as important values underpinning the Charter. See e.g.
Leckey, supra note 8; Agarwal, supra note 42 (on the connection between autonomy and an
immutability test and on the importance of autonomy to the interpretation of s 15(1) in
general). Autonomy, however, has not been the explicit focus of the SCC’s own account of s
15(1), and has an uneasy fit with the SCC’s approach to ideas of constructive immutability.
See Leckey, supra note 8 at 450-51. Autonomy is also a value that may not necessarily always
be best enforced via a commitment to non-discrimination, rather than to liberty of the
person more directly. See Avigail Eisenberg, “Rights in the Age of Identity Politics” (2013)
50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 609 (another potential justification is that immutability can help
focus attention on the relationship between individual and group identity); Richard Moon,
“Government Support for Religious Practice” in Richard Moon, ed, Law and Religious
Pluralism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 217.
63. Supra note 14 at paras 23-32.
64. Ibid at para 25.
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consent, make informed personal or public decisions, or be required to engage
in certain compulsory activities (such as compulsory education or vision and
hearing testing). Likewise, a criminal record is something that is generally impossible to change, once obtained, but a legitimate basis on which governments may
make certain distinctions, such as those relating to access to certain kinds of jobs
or information. Marital status or citizenship, on the other hand, are often at least
somewhat “mutable” or open to change, or control, by individuals.65 Yet they are also
morally irrelevant for most government purposes, outside the context of immigration
law or the regulation of the rights and obligations of marriage itself.66
The immutability of a characteristic will tend to be closely linked to questions
of moral and practical relevance in only a relatively small subset of cases, where
it is presumptively legitimate for the government to draw certain distinctions in
order to regulate individual conduct. Yet the distinction in question is in fact
illegitimate because of an individual’s lack of control over that conduct. In the
United States, the canonical example of this kind of case is Plyler v Doe,67 which
concerned the rights of undocumented immigrant children. The fact that the
relevant alien children could affect “neither their parents’ conduct nor their
own status” was a central reason for the Court’s decision that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause for Texas to exclude them from access to its public
schools, notwithstanding the Court’s finding that it was legitimate for the
state to attempt to deter illegal immigration by denying certain benefits to
undocumented aliens.68
From an anti-subordination perspective, in turn, the most important
indicator of suspect decision making by the government will be that it targets a
group subject to historical prejudice, exclusion, or disadvantage. In most cases,
identifying such disadvantage is best done directly, by focusing on the actual history
of disadvantage experienced by a particular group or sub-group of citizens, and
not on abstract criteria (whether immutability, or some other criterion) about the
defining characteristics of the group. While there are certainly structural factors that
contribute to systemic disadvantage, including political powerlessness,69 there is
Ibid at para 25 (significant emphasis was placed on this argument by the defendants).
Cf. ibid at paras 26-27, Gonthier J.
457 US 202, 102 S Ct 2382 (1982) [Plyler cited to US].
Ibid at 238. The US Supreme Court also stressed the danger of excluding children from
schooling, and thereby creating a “discrete underclass” of future citizens (ibid at 234). The
plurality also raised some questions about the extent to which it was legitimate to deter
entry, while also encouraging and tolerating the presence of undocumented aliens in certain
respects as a source of cheap labour (ibid at 218-19).
69. See Andrews, supra note 11 at para 68.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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often little logic to the particular groups in a society who experience the most
acute disadvantage.
Where such a backward-looking approach is not possible because, for
example, the concern is about creating newly disadvantaged groups, it is also
far from clear how, or why, immutability (as opposed to, say, the centrality
or visibility of a characteristic) is a good predictor of subordination. Where a
government treats a particular group adversely, the most critical question, from
an anti-subordination perspective, will be whether the relevant form of adverse
treatment is either likely to lead to, or be correlated with, further adverse
treatment by other government actors or private individuals.
One factor that will affect the answer to this question will be whether the
particular adverse treatment relates to a person’s status, rather than conduct, and
thus sends a clear message of disrespect or disregard for a particular group as
less worthy of full human dignity. Another factor, as Justice Wilson noted in
Andrews and Turpin, will be whether the relevant group lacks effective legal and
political power, and thus cannot obtain effective protection against such adverse
treatment.70 Beyond this, when it comes to individual characteristics, the most
relevant question would seem to be whether a particular ground of adverse
treatment is visible to others, either as an individual characteristic or group
identity, and thus easily targeted as a basis of adverse treatment. If so, the ground
is so “central,” or defining, for individuals as part of their individual or group
identity that they are likely to interact frequently with others on the same basis
that has attracted disadvantage.71
Consider, for instance, the adverse government treatment of three groups:
waitresses, sex workers, and women generally. Waitresses, in most contexts,
seem unlikely to be systematically disadvantaged, whereas women, as a class,
have experienced a long history of social, economic, and political disadvantage.
Sex workers, in turn, arguably fall somewhere in the middle. The most compelling
explanation for this, however, is not that it is relatively easy to stop being a
waitress (and become, say, a sales assistant), significantly harder to leave the sex
industry (because of a lack of relevant marketable skills and coercion within the
sex industry), and almost impossible to stop being female for those who identify
as such (except at “unacceptable personal cost”). In a society committed to
70. Andrews, supra note 11 at para 5; Turpin, supra note 33 at para 47. This, as Justice Wilson
notes, is also one reason why in the United States, even though the label is not wholly
accurate, suspect or quasi-suspect classes are often referred to as “discrete and insular
minorities.” See Andrews, supra note 11 at para 6.
71. Cf. Sadurski, supra note 7.
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equality, we do not generally think that the victims of adverse treatment should
be told to “escape” such treatment by changing their attributes, or status, as opposed
to conduct. Rather, it is that when the government treats waitresses poorly (by,
for example, allowing them to be paid a lower wage or providing them with
fewer workplace protections), we do not generally think that this will lead to, or
be correlated with, systematic mistreatment of waitresses outside the workplace.
Waitresses are not generally identified by others, or themselves, by their
occupation in non-work related contexts. As voters, they have a real chance of
obtaining support from others with similar workplace conditions and experiences
(for example via “Unite Here!,” the umbrella trade union for hospitality, airport,
laundry, food service, gaming, manufacturing, and textile workers).72 Sex workers,
in contrast, are often labelled or defined by others in a range of other contexts by
reference to their working identity; and, depending on the legal status of their
work, may have much greater difficulty forming a successful political coalition. It
is more likely still that if waitresses or sex workers experience adverse treatment
as women (or more specifically, poor women, immigrant women, or women of
colour), this adverse treatment will turn out to carry over into all aspects of their
life. This treatment will be truly systemic, by tracking a highly visible and for
many, defining, individual characteristic and by relying far more strongly on
individual status, rather than conduct, as the basis of adverse treatment.
The actual or constructive immutability of an individual characteristic will,
at best, be only tangentially relevant to these criteria of political power, visibility, or
centrality. Distinctions based on truly immutable characteristics may be more
likely to track a person’s status, rather than conduct, or to be based on visible personal
characteristics. The immutability test, however, also encompasses a range of
“constructively immutable” characteristics (such as citizenship, marital status,
and sexual orientation) where there is a much blurrier line between conduct,
choice, and status, and where there is little real connection to visibility.73 Similarly,
truly immutable characteristics may or may not be “central” or defining for particular
individuals. Often, it is the choice to identify oneself in terms of particular
personal characteristics (such as sex, religion, or sexual orientation) that makes
the particular characteristic defining, and not the fact that the characteristic is
unalterable or given.74
72. Online: <http://www.uniteherecanada.org>.
73. Compare Leckey, supra note 8.
74. Cf. Sadurski, supra note 7 (for statements of leading women and African-Americans
downplaying gender or race as defining characteristics).
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From a human dignity perspective, there is again a limited connection
between those grounds of distinction that are most fraught and those characteristics of
an individual that are truly immutable. Government action based on individual
characteristics that are generally morally or practically irrelevant will certainly
raise concerns from a dignity-based perspective. Distinctions that track
characteristics of a highly personal, or defining, nature will also tend to be more
problematic than those based on less central or defining aspects of individual
identity, particularly where those distinctions involve adverse treatment. True
immutability, however, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for either
the irrelevancy or personal nature of a characteristic. “Constructive immutability”
is also a test that has little factual connection in this context to ideas about irrelevance
or centrality: its connection depends on ideas about fairness and individual
autonomy and dignity, which are in no way advanced or made easier to apply by
invocation of the idea of immutability itself.75
The historical disadvantage of particular groups may also be relevant, in some
cases, under a human dignity-based approach. Where particular characteristics have
attracted systematic adverse treatment in the past, distinctions based on them are
certainly more likely to feel threatening to individuals and their sense of being
afforded equal concern and respect in the present. Likewise, previous adverse
treatment may give certain groups a special claim to respect and accommodation
as part of true respect for their collective human dignity.76 Again, however, such
concerns will have little to do with the immutability of the characteristics that
define a particular group, since it is the sense of insult or psychological injury that
is critical to the violation of human dignity in both contexts, not the inability
to flee from past or ongoing disadvantage because of lack of control over, or the
immutability of, characteristics.
In several cases, this gap between the substantive equality values identified by
the SCC in the context of subsection 15(1) and the criterion of immutability has
led lower courts to take a surprisingly narrow approach to claims of inequality
based on concepts of economic disadvantage or subordination.77 Prior to Corbière,
75. See ibid (for an extremely eloquent and more extensive version of this argument in a more
general context).
76. Cf. e.g. Holocaust Denial Case, 90 BVerfGE 241, 1994 NJW 1779 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany)
(noting that for German Jews “[i]t is part of their personal self-image that they are seen as
attached to a group of persons marked out by their fate, against which group there exists a
special moral responsibility on the part of everyone else and which is a part of their dignity”).
77. For scholarly arguments in favour of the importance of structural, or systemic, disadvantage
as a touchstone for the scope of s 15(1), see e.g. Hart Schwartz, “Making Sense of Section
15 of the Charter” (2011) 29:2 NJCL 201; Ian Savage, “Systemic Discrimination and
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in Sparks v Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority,78 for example,
provincial courts took a broad approach to claims of discrimination based on
poverty or income, as at least one intersecting ground of discrimination under
subsection 15(1). In Sparks, a public housing tenant who was a black, poor, single
mother challenged provisions denying her the same protections for security
of tenure available to tenants in privately owned housing. In upholding this
claim, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal gave extensive attention to historical
disadvantage suffered both by public housing tenants generally and by particular
subgroups of public housing tenants. Poverty for single mothers, it suggested,
was “no less a personal characteristic … than non-citizenship was in Andrews.”79
On this basis, the court concluded that public housing tenants were a group
analogous to those identified in subsection 15(1).
Since Corbière, in contrast, provincial courts have applied a far more
mechanical test, asking whether the poor are “a discrete and insular group defined
by a common personal characteristic,”80 whether poverty as a condition is in any
way alterable by individuals, whether “financial circumstances may change” such
that “individuals may enter and leave poverty,” and whether the government has
a legitimate interest in encouraging individuals to exit from poverty.81 By answering
these questions in the negative, provincial courts have given little meaningful
scrutiny to the potential for various laws to draw distinctions that both track
and entrench pre-existing economic disadvantage (for example, laws prohibiting
certain forms of public solicitation of money or laws imposing uniform tariffs for
energy consumption).82

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

Section 15 of the Charter” (1985-1986) 50:1 Sask L Rev 141. For this kind of argument in
the context of socioeconomic disadvantage specifically, see Bruce Porter, “Twenty Years of
Equality Rights: Reclaiming Expectation” (2005) 23:1 Windsor YB of Access Just 145.
(1993), 119 NSR (2d) 91, 101 DLR (4th) 224 (CA) [Sparks cited to NSR].
Ibid at para 32.
See e.g. R v Banks (2007) 84 OR (3d) 1 at para 104, 275 DLR (4th) 640 (CA) [Banks]
[emphasis added].
See e.g. Boulter v Nova Scotia Power Inc (2009), 275 NSR (2d) 214 at para 42 [Boulter]
(noting that “a clinging web” is “not an indelible trait like race, national or ethnic origin,
color, gender or age” because “financial circumstances may change, and individuals may enter
and leave poverty or gain or lose resources”).
See the facts in Banks, supra note 80; ibid. There is, of course, an important question as to
whether, in a market economy, courts are well-equipped to distinguish “legitimate” from
illegitimate discrimination based on poverty, or whether poverty is an analogous ground that
“fits” with the general absence of socioeconomic rights in the Charter. There does, however,
seem to be at least some potential scope for the SCC and lower courts to have gone further in
applying scrutiny to such distinctions. See e.g. Margot Young, “Social Justice and the Charter:
Comparison and Choice” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 669 (expressing similar concerns).
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III. WHY THE COMBINATION? THE IMPORTANCE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINES
What, then, accounts for this surprising combination of generous interpretation
and increasing formalism on the part of the SCC within the same body of equality
jurisprudence? One potential answer, this Part suggests, can be found in the
number and scope of the analogical baselines in subsection 15(1), and how the
SCC has approached their relationship to each other.83
A. SUBSECTION 15(1) AND HETEROGENEOUS GROUNDS

From the perspective of different theories of equality, subsection 15(1) contains
a great deal of heterogeneity in the grounds it lists as enumerated grounds of
discrimination.
From an anti-stereotyping perspective, for example, many of the grounds
listed in subsection 15(1) touch on personal characteristics that are almost never
morally or practically relevant for government action, except possibly in a remedial
context. Others involve characteristics that may sometimes be relevant, from a
practical perspective, but which in general society regards as having limited moral
relevance for the opportunities and rewards open to individuals. Others, however,
involve characteristics with a far closer relationship to individuals’ actual needs
and capacities,84 and thus with a far less natural relationship to a theory of “moral
and practical irrelevance.”85
One way in which courts might have done so would have been to focus, as the Court of
Appeal did in Sparks, on the intersection between poverty and other prohibited grounds of
discrimination. See supra note 78. I am indebted to Jennifer Nedelsky for this suggestion.
83. Another explanation, of course, is that the analogous grounds requirement under s 15(1)
actually does no work in the SCC’s analysis, and is simply equivalent to a conclusion that the
SCC does, or does not, regard particular discrimination as justified. See e.g. Gibson, supra
note 7. This would also explain why the SCC has been somewhat inconsistent over time in
its approach to the analogous grounds question, though not necessarily why there has been
convergence toward a more consistently formalist test, even in the face of a quite generous
application of that test, as in Corbière. Another potential explanation might be changes in
the composition of the SCC. See e.g. Rosalind Dixon, “Weak-form Judicial Review and
American Exceptionalism”(2012) 32:2 Oxford J Legal Stud 487. Such changes, however, do
not seem to offer a sufficient explanation in the circumstances, given the presence of at least
five of the same justices in cases such as Miron and Corbière.
84. See e.g. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C Nussbaum, “Children’s Rights and a Capabilities
Approach: The Question of Special Priority” (2012) 97:3 Cornell L Rev 549 [Dixon &
Nussbaum, “Children’s Rights”].
85. This precise issue was in fact raised by feminist groups at the time s 15(1) was drafted in
the form of a concern that age, as an enumerated ground, could potentially dilute the
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Consider the differences between race, gender, disability, and age as enumerated
grounds of discrimination in this context. Race, most Canadians agree, is
almost never morally or practically relevant to government action, except to the
extent it is part of an attempt to “ameliorate the predicament of a group more
disadvantaged.”86 Gender is similarly morally and practically irrelevant for most
purposes, though not necessarily in the context of “real” differences between the
sexes in terms of physical strength, vulnerability to certain forms of sexual violence87
or certain consequences associated with such violence,88 and medical and other
needs associated with pregnancy.89
Disability, on the other hand, will be far more frequently relevant to government
policy. As the SCC noted in Eaton v Brant County Board of Education,90 it is both
empirically true and practically relevant for certain purposes (such as who may
obtain a driver’s license, for example, or be a fire captain) that “[t]he blind person
cannot see and the person in a wheelchair needs a ramp.”91 Thus, in most cases, it
is not “the attribution of stereotypical characteristics” to persons with disabilities
that is the source of discrimination based on disability. Rather, it is the failure to
provide appropriate accommodation and support for persons with disabilities,
based on their “actual characteristics” and needs, that causes restrictions on their
opportunity for full social and economic inclusion and participation.92
A person’s age will be similarly relevant to a range of legitimate government
interests, or objectives,93 particularly at the very early and later stages of life when

86.

87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

guarantee of equal opportunity, or anti-stereotyping, for women. See e.g. BL Strayer, “In the
Beginning…: The Origins of Section 15 of the Charter” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 13 at 22.
The response of the drafters of s 15(1), however, was simply to reverse the order of sex and
age in the list of enumerated grounds found in s 15(1). See Mary Dawson, “The Making of
Section 15 of the Charter” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 25 at 30-31. This response, however,
has had no discernible effect on the subsequent interpretation of the provision.
Lavoie v Canada, 2002 SCC 23 at para 45, 1 SCR 769, Bastarache J; Kapp, supra note 50
at 508, McLachlin CJ & Abella J (discussing the scope and purpose of s 15(2)). See also
discussion in Leckey, supra note 8 at 460-61.
See e.g. Weatherall v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 872, 105 DLR (4th) 210
(upholding differences in male-to-female, versus female-to-male, searches by prison guards
on this basis).
See e.g. R v Nguyen; R v Hess, [1990] 2 SCR 906, [1990] SCJ No 91 (QL) (upholding a sexspecific prohibition on statutory rape).
See e.g. discussion in Miron, supra note 14 at para 30, Gonthier J.
[1997] 1 SCR 241, 31 OR (3d) 574 [Eaton cited to SCR].
Ibid at para 67, Sopinka J.
Ibid.
See e.g. McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 at para 88, 2 OR (3d) 319
[McKinney]. La Forest J notes that
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the government has a legitimate interest in protecting individuals from
exploitation and mistreatment, and, in the case of children, protecting and
fostering the capacity for later autonomous and informed adult choice.94
Likewise, from an anti-subordination perspective, subsection 15(1)
contains grounds that are both completely neutral as regards the experience
of historical disadvantage, and that are far more asymmetric or specifically
focused on a history of subordination.95 The clearest example of such an
asymmetric guarantee is the prohibition in subsection 15(1) on discrimination
based on mental or physical disability. As the SCC noted in Eldridge v British
Columbia (Attorney General), persons with disabilities have been subjected
to a long and unfortunate history of “exclusion and marginalization” in the
workplace and in various other contexts, resulting in persistent social and economic
disadvantage compared to those conforming to “able-bodied norms.”96 Most
other enumerated grounds, in contrast, encompass groups that clearly have
experienced historical prejudice and disadvantage, and groups that have not.97

there are important differences between age discrimination and some of the other grounds
mentioned in s. 15(1). To begin with there is nothing inherent in most of the specified grounds
of discrimination, e.g., race, colour, religion, national or ethnic origin, or sex that supports any
general correlation between those characteristics and ability. But that is not the case with age.

94. Dixon & Nussbaum, “Children’s Rights,” supra note 84.
95. Cf. Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 at para 31, 4 SCR 429, McLachlin
CJ [Gosselin] (suggesting that “[m]any of the enumerated grounds correspond to historically
disadvantaged groups”).
96. [1997] 3 SCR 624 at para 56, 151 DLR (4th) 577, La Forest J (citing M David Lepofsky,
“A Report Card on the Charter’s Guarantee of Equality to Persons with Disabilities after
10 Years – What Progress? What Prospects?” (1997) 7:2 NJCL 263); Statistics Canada, A
Portrait of Persons with Disabilities (Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, 1995)
at 46-49; Sandra A Goundry & Yvonne Peters, Litigating for Disability Equality Rights:
The Promises and the Pitfalls (Winnipeg: Canadian Disabilities Rights Council, 1994) at
5-6. See also CGK Atkins, “A Cripple at a Rich Man’s Gate: A Comparison of Disability,
Employment and Anti-discrimination Law in the United States and Canada” (2006) 21:2
Canadian J L & Society 87.
97. There is, of course, always the potential for this to change, or for old hierarchies to not
simply disappear, but to actually be reversed. This, for example, is a concern implicit in
some affirmative action jurisprudence in the US. See e.g. Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena,
515 US 200 at 239, 115 S Ct 2097 (1995), Scalia J (emphasizing the danger of ideas about
“debtor” and “creditor” races). This potential also often underpins courts’ approaches to
equality guarantees more generally. See e.g. Pretoria (City of ) v Walker, [1998] 3 B Const LR
257 at para 47, 2 S Afr LR 363 (Const Ct). There is, nonetheless, an important distinction
between the symmetry and asymmetry of grounds from a backward-looking perspective. I
am indebted to Mark Tushnet for pressing me on this point.
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Whiteness, for example, has not, by itself, been a marker of historical disadvantage in Canada, whereas being black,98 or Aboriginal,99 has frequently been
associated with such disadvantage.100 Being male has generally been associated with
social, political, and economic privilege, rather than disadvantage,101 whereas
being female has meant the systematic denial of access to political and economic
power and opportunity,102 disproportionate vulnerability to physical and
sexual violence,103 and economic deprivation.104 Whereas being young (at least
for adults) has often meant access to social and economic opportunity,105 old
age has often been associated with social stigma, and social and economic
marginalization. 106 Similarly, dominant faith groups within mainstream
Christian churches have tended to enjoy significant social and government
support, whereas various religious minorities, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses107 and
Jewish Canadians, have been the object of widespread societal prejudice and,
in some cases, legally sanctioned disadvantage and marginalization.108 Roman
Catholics have also experienced significant social prejudice and hatred (while enjoying
certain constitutionally sanctioned forms of support in other contexts),109 as have
98. See e.g. Sparks, supra note 78.
99. See Corbière, supra note 5 at paras 18-19, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.
100. See e.g. J Helen Beck, Jeffrey G Reitz & Nan Weiner, “Addressing Systemic Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Health Canada Case and Implications of Legislative
Change” (2002) 28:3 Can Pub Pol’y 373. See also Julie Jai & Joseph Cheng, “The Invisibility
of Race in Section 15: Why Section 15 of the Charter Has Not Done More to Promote
Racial Equality” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 125.
101. Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 34 at para 20, 1 SCR 835.
102. See e.g. Edwards v Canada (Attorney General), [1928] SCR 276, 4 DLR 98.
103. See e.g. R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 4 OR (3d) 383, L’Heureux-Dubé &
Gonthier JJ (dissenting).
104. See e.g. Sparks, supra note 78; Anderson, supra note 24 at 43. See more generally Statistics
Canada, Women in Canada: A Gender-Based Statistical Report, 5th ed (Ottawa: Minister of
Industry, 2006).
105. See e.g. Law, supra note 31 at para 101, Iacobucci J; Gosselin, supra note 95 at paras 32-33,
McLachlin CJ (“[y]oung people do not have a similar history of being undervalued … as a general
matter … young adults as a class simply do not seem especially vulnerable or undervalued”).
106. See e.g. McKinney, supra note 93 at 431-32, L’Heureux-Dubé J (discussion of the potentially
marginalizing effect of retirement).
107. See e.g. Saumur v Quebec (City), [1953] 2 SCR 299, 4 DLR 641 [Saumar cited to SCR];
Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689 [Roncarelli cited to SCR], as discussed
in Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609 at 661, 30 OR (3d) 642, L’Heureux-Dubé J (dissenting).
108. See e.g. Saumar, supra note 107; Roncarelli, supra note 107.
109. See e.g. David Matas, “Waldman v Canada: Religious Discrimination in the Constitution”
(2000) 11:3 Const Forum Const 99.
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members of certain South Asian religions, who have likewise experienced significant
social prejudice and hatred.110
B. MULTI-PRONGED VS. SYNTHETIC APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL
BASELINES

Heterogeneity of this kind in a constitution’s baseline categories can prompt
courts to respond quite differently to new constitutional claims, depending on
how judges approach the task of comparing new and existing constitutional
categories.
One approach is to ask whether the new category has any similarity with one
or more of the existing baseline constitutional categories. Under this “direct” or
“multi-pronged” approach, the greater the number and heterogeneity of baseline
categories, the more likely that a court will find such similarity. The greater the
diversity of features that can be identified among constitutional baselines, the
more likely it is that any new constitutional category will share one or more of
those features.
A good example of this, from a comparative perspective, is the approach
of the Delhi High Court and the legal committee of the House of Lords to the
recognition of sexual orientation as an “analogous” ground for the purposes of
Articles 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution,111 and Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights,112 respectively. In both India and the UK, the
constitutional guarantee of equality, or non-discrimination, contains a number of
(at least somewhat) diverse enumerated grounds, but is otherwise much narrower
than in Canada.113 Yet it has been relatively easy for plaintiffs in both countries
to persuade the relevant courts to apply heightened scrutiny to distinctions based
110. Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society,
Equality Now! (March 1984) at 69 (Chair: Bob Daudlin), as discussed in R v Keegstra, [1990]
3 SCR 697 at para 59, 3 CRR (2d) 193.
111. India Const, 1950.
112. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950,
213 UNTS 221 at 223, Eur TS 5 [Convention].
113. In contrast to the four distinct guarantees of equality under s 15(1) of the Charter, s 15(1)
of the Indian Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of “religion, race, caste,
sex, [and] place of birth.” Section 16(1) guarantees equality of opportunity and prohibits
discrimination on those grounds; s 16(2) prohibits discrimination on the basis of “descent”
and “residence,” but only in respect of public employment. In the UK, art 14 of the European
Convention simply provides a guarantee of non-discrimination in respect of the enjoyment
of other rights, and not an independent guarantee of equality. For discussion, see e.g. Rory
O’Connell, “Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to Non-discrimination
in the ECHR” (2009) 29:2 LS 211.
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on sexual orientation by relying on a multi-pronged approach to the question of
analogous grounds.
In Naz Foundation v Government of DCT of Delhi,114 for example, the Delhi
High Court held that certain provisions of the Indian Criminal Code115 prohibiting
“unnatural sexual acts,” such as anal intercourse between men violated the guarantee
of equality in Article 15 of the Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied strongly on an analogy between sex and sexual orientation,
first noting cases that found discrimination based on sexual orientation to be
equivalent to sex-based discrimination,116 and then concluding (without further
analysis) that “sexual orientation is a ground analogous to sex.”117
Similarly, in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,118 the House of Lords held that
it was incompatible with Article 8 (the right to family life) and Article 14
of the Convention for the UK Parliament to extend certain statutory tenancy
rights to opposite but not to same-sex couples on the death of a partner. Lord
Nicholls, in reaching this decision, reasoned simply that laws “must not draw a
distinction on grounds such as sex or sexual orientation without good reason.”119
Baroness Hale, in turn, drew a direct analogy between discrimination based on
sexual orientation and discrimination based on sex or race. In her view, these
two express grounds of discrimination were united by “stereotypical assumptions
… which had nothing to do with the qualities of the individual involved,” and
which were equally applicable to discrimination against gay and lesbian people,
or same-sex relationships.120
An alternative approach, however, is for courts to attempt first to identify a
common thread or denominator behind existing constitutional categories and
only then to proceed to compare new (claimed) constitutional categories with a
constitution’s existing baselines. Such an approach has the attraction for courts
114. (2009) 160 DLT 277 at para 1, [2009] WP(C) No.7455/2001 (H Ct Delhi) [Naz
Foundation] (currently subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court of India). For commentary,
see Pritam Baruah, “Logic and Coherence in Naz Foundation: The Arguments of NonDiscrimination, Privacy and Dignity” (2009) 2:3 NUJS L Rev 505; Vikram Raghavan,
“Navigating the Noteworthy and Nebulous in Naz Foundation” (2009) 2 NUJS L Rev 397.
115. RSC 1985, c C-46.
116. Naz Foundation, supra note 114 at para 100, citing Selected Decisions of the Human Rights
Committee Under the Optional Protocol, HRC Dec 488/1992, UNHRCOR, 50th Sess, UN
Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, (1994) 133 at 139-40 (referring to Toonen v Australia).
117. Naz Foundation, supra note 114 at para 104.
118. [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557, (UK) [Ghaidan cited to UKHL].
119. Ibid at para 6 [emphasis added] (the opinion was joined by Lord Steyn, Lord Rodger &
Baroness Hale).
120. Ibid at paras 130-32.
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of being more systematic and consistent in its formal application than a direct
or multi-pronged approach. It thus appeals understandably to judges as part of
an attempt to develop an analytically rigorous and predictable body of equality
jurisprudence.121
Such an approach, however, produces a different response by courts to the
heterogeneous grounds. Rather than leading to a broader, more permissive approach
to the recognition of new constitutional grounds as analogous, it tends to lead to
more abstract reasoning by courts about the test for analogous grounds.
The more numerous and diverse the existing constitutional categories, the
more difficult it will be for courts, under such an approach, to find commonality
among those grounds in their scope, significance, or underlying purpose. And
thus the more likely it will be that courts will need to resort to high levels of
abstraction in order to identify even some form of internal coherence or
common denominator amongst them. Some degree of abstraction in constitutional
reasoning may be desirable (and unavoidable), to generate greater judicial impartiality
or neutrality.122 Abstraction of this kind is, however, likely to lead courts significantly
beyond that level, instead involving a form of “lofty” reasoning with little or no
connection to underlying constitutional commitments or concerns.123
Support for this understanding can be found in the approach of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa to the test for analogousness under section
8(2) of the 1993 South African Constitution124 and under section 9(3) of the 1996
Constitution.125 Section 8(2) of the 1993 Constitution contained a prohibition
against unfair discrimination on 13 distinct enumerated grounds: race, gender,
sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, and language. Like subsection 15(1) of the Charter,
this list also included characteristics, or grounds, with quite different attributes,
relevance, and degrees of symmetry.126 In developing a test for analogousness
121. See Leckey, supra note 8 (for the potential relevance of this in the Canadian context).
122. Compare e.g. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005)
(on the relationship between abstraction and values of impartiality in constitutional decision
making); Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007) (providing similar arguments about the relationship
between “veil rules” and impartiality values). I am indebted to Wojciech Sadurski for this point.
123. See the sources cited at supra note 59.
124. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, No 200 of 1993.
125. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, No 108 of 1996.
126. See e.g. Harksen v Lane NO and Others (1997), [1998] 1 SA 300 at para 49, (CCT9/97)
[1997] ZACC 12, Goldstone J (S Afr Const Ct) [Harksen] (“[i]n some cases they relate to
immutable biological attributes or characteristics, in some to the associational life of humans,
in some to the intellectual, expressive and religious dimensions of humanity and in some
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under section 8(2), the Constitutional Court also ultimately attempted to
develop a common denominator approach to “unfairness,” similar to that of the
SCC in Corbière.127
In Prinsloo, for example, the Constitutional Court suggested that what
underpinned unfair discrimination, and thus the definition of an analogous
ground for the purposes of section 8(2), was “treating persons differently in a way
which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently
equal in dignity.”128 Similarly, in Harksen, it held that the key test was whether
discrimination was based on “attributes or characteristics which have the potential
to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them
adversely in a comparably serious manner.”129 On their own, such criteria are
so broad and abstract130 as to provide almost no guidance to subsequent judges
regarding whether particular grounds are analogous131 for the purposes either of
cases to a combination of one or more of these features”).
127. Prinsloo v Van der Linde, [1997] ZACC 5 at para 31, (6) B Const LR 759 (S Afr Const Ct)
[Prinsloo] (“[a]lthough one thinks in the first instance of discrimination on the grounds of
race and ethnic origin one should never lose sight in any historical evaluation of other forms
of discrimination … [and thus unfair discrimination] in the context of section 8 as a whole”
[emphasis added]).
128. Ibid at para 31.
129. Harksen, supra note 126 at para 49. At the same time, the Constitutional Court also noted
that “the temptation to force [the different enumerated grounds] into neatly self-contained
categories should be resisted” (at para 47).
130. It should be noted that the Constitutional Court has not necessarily closely followed this test
in subsequent cases involving the question of analogous grounds, but rather engaged in a far
more wide-ranging inquiry, involving greater focus on more substantive understandings of
equality. See e.g. Hoffman v South African Airways, [2000] ZACC 17 at para 28, (11) B Const
LR 1235, (S Afr Const Ct) (identifying HIV status as an analogous ground for the purposes
of section 9(3), after considering the history of “systemic disadvantage and discrimination,”
“stigm[a]” and “marginali[zation]” experienced by those living with HIV, and their social
and political “vulnerability”); Khosa v Minister of Social Development, [2004] ZACC 11 at
para 71, (6) B Const LR 569, (S Afr Const Ct) [Khosa] (holding that permanent resident
status was an analogous ground in large part because of permanent residents’ lack of “political
muscle,” and the fact that “in the South African context individuals were deprived of rights
or benefits ostensibly on the basis of citizenship, but in reality in circumstances where
citizenship was governed by race”).
131. The idea of human dignity certainly has the potential to provide valuable guidance to a court
in determining the scope of a constitutional guarantee of equality but to do so, it requires a
great deal more elaboration and development. See e.g. Rory O’Connell, “The Role of Dignity
in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa” (2008) 6:2 Intl J Const L 267. One
such approach to its elaboration or development can be found in the “capabilities approach”
of Martha Nussbaum. See e.g. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C Nussbaum, “Abortion, Dignity,
and a Capabilities Approach” in Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi Kahana, eds,
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section 8(2), or of the largely equivalent provisions in section 9(3) of the 1996
Constitution.132
Moreover, this difference between the multi-pronged and common
denominator approaches provides at least one plausible explanation for the
surprising combination of broad and generous interpretation with high
formalism on the part of the SCC in its analogous grounds jurisprudence because,
over time, there has been a subtle shift by the SCC in this context from a multipronged to a more synthetic approach.
In some early cases, the SCC and lower courts were quite explicit in their
willingness to apply a multi-pronged approach to the analogous grounds
question. Take the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Egan133 in which
it held, on the basis of a concession by the parties, that sexual orientation is “a
ground analogous to discrimination based on ‘sex.’”134 In justifying its conclusion,
the court relied strongly on the connection between discrimination based on
sexual orientation and sex in the particular case, noting that one of the plaintiffs
had “been denied a benefit under the law equal to that to which an opposite sex
common law spouse is entitled.”135
Similarly, in Miron, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) found that marital
status is an analogous ground in part by relying on a direct analogy to religion
as an enumerated ground. Discrimination on the basis of marital status, she
suggested, could be analogized to discrimination on the ground of religion “to
the extent that it finds its roots and expression in moral disapproval of all sexual
unions except those sanctioned by church and state.”136 Even more important,
she suggested that the fact that marital status is at least partially chosen by
individuals (even if unevenly so by different individuals) need not be a bar to its
recognition as an analogous ground because “[r]eligion, an enumerated ground,
is not immutable.”137
In Andrews, in adopting a range of substantive criteria for analogousness in
addition to a test of immutability, the SCC also gave implicit effect to a multipronged approach. The SCC’s emphasis on the notion of a “discrete and insular

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2012) 64.
The Constitutional Court has affirmed the same test under s 9(3) of the Constitution. See e.g.
Khosa, supra note 130 at para 70.
Supra note 18.
Ibid at para 3.
Ibid.
Miron, supra note 14 at para 154.
Ibid at para 149.
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minority,” for example, clearly applies to only a subset of the enumerated grounds
under subsection 15(1), such as certain racial, ethnic, or religious minorities,
and some non-citizen groups, but not to women138 or the aged.139 The focus
on historical disadvantage by Justice La Forest was also more relevant to certain
clearly asymmetric, rather than symmetric, grounds.
In Corbière, in contrast, the SCC shifted quite explicitly toward a synthetic
approach to the analogous grounds question, suggesting that
what [the enumerated] grounds have in common is the fact that they often serve as
the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the basis of merit but on the basis
of a personal characteristic that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable
cost to personal identity.140

IV. CONCLUSION: CANADIAN LESSONS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND AMENDMENT
In the United States in the last decade, there has been a vibrant debate among constitutional scholars as to the relevance (or irrelevance) of formal amendments to the US
Constitution and as to the failure of certain proposed amendments, such as the ERA.
To date, however, this debate has tended to focus almost exclusively on the immediate
jurisprudential consequences of the success or failure of particular amendments.
Scholars such as David Strauss have argued that because the US Supreme Court has
increasingly required “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for all classifications
based on sex, even in the absence of the ERA,141 “it is difficult to identify any respect
in which constitutional law is different from what it would have been if the ERA had
been adopted.”142 Others, such as Adrian Vermeule, have responded by arguing that
it is important to consider the degree to which amendments may alter the probability
of particular legal outcomes.143 Neither side in the debate has focused on the way in
which formal constitutional amendments such as the ERA may have had the potential
to expand the analogical baseline employed by the US Supreme Court in responding to
new, unrelated claims to constitutional protection or recognition.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Kathleen M Sullivan, “Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality” (2002) 90:3 Cal L Rev 735.
See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 55.18ff.
Supra note 5 at para 13, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ [emphasis added].
See United States v Virginia, [1996] 518 US 515 at 524, 116 S Ct 2264 (SC).
David A Strauss, “The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments” (2001) 114:5 Harv L Rev
1457 at 1476-77.
143. Adrian Vermeule, “Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law” in
Richard W Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds, The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures
in the Constitutional State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 229.
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The lessons of the SCC’s Charter jurisprudence for an American audience,
in this context, are thus both important and quite simple, namely that the
number and scope of analogical baselines in a constitution can matter a great
deal, even if in unpredictable ways. This, in turn, suggests that had proposed
amendments such as the ERA been enacted, they would very likely have had
real, if also unpredictable, consequences for the US Supreme Court’s approach
to other equal protection cases, by making gender a distinct analogical baseline
against which new claims to heightened scrutiny could be measured, rather
than simply a category itself dependent on an analogy to race.
The most likely consequence of this, as I have argued elsewhere, would
have been to encourage a greater willingness on the part of the US Supreme
Court to recognize certain claims to heightened scrutiny, such as those based
on age, disability, and sexual orientation.144 Another possibility, however,
is that the US Supreme Court could simply have moved to adopt a quite
different, even if not necessarily more expansive, approach to the test for
heightened scrutiny.145
In other countries, the SCC’s approach offers potentially even more
important and specific lessons for constitutional drafters and re-drafters who
are debating the scope of constitutional rights to equality more generally.
Many governments in recent years have ostensibly attempted to strengthen
small “c” constitutional commitments to equality by adopting (or proposing)
legislation that both expands and unifies pre-existing legislative prohibitions
on discrimination. 146 The drafters of new constitutions in countries such
as Kenya have been praised for progressively refining the draft of constitutional guarantees of equality so as to provide “additional protection” via
the recognition of a larger and more diverse list of enumerated grounds of
discrimination.147
144. Rosalind Dixon, “Amending Constitutional Identity” (2012) 33:5 Cardozo L Rev 1847-58
(especially 1855) [Dixon, “Constitutional Identity”].
145. In the UK, for example, a synthetic approach to race and gender tended to produce
a distinctive focus on notions of moral and practical irrelevance as the touchstone for
analogousness or heightened scrutiny under art 14. See e.g. Ghaidan, supra note 118 at para
130, Baroness Hale. At present, the US Supreme Court focuses on a far greater range of
factors it deems implicit in race-based discrimination. See Dixon, “Constitutional Identity,”
supra note 144.
146. See e.g. Equality Act 2010 (UK), c 15. See also Law Council of Australia, submission to the
Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Consolidation of Commonwealth Anti-Discrimination
Laws Discussion Paper (1 February 2012) (for similar proposals in Australia).
147. See e.g. Jim Fitzgerald, “The Road to Equality? The Right to Equality in Kenya’s New
Constitution” (2010) 5 Equal Rights Rev 55 at 58.
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The lesson of Corbière in this context, however, is that more may not
always be better—at least within the same constitutional instrument148—if the
aim is to encourage judges to give broad effect to a particular preferred vision of
equality. Given the kind of synthetic approach adopted by the SCC in Corbière,
too much internal diversity in a constitution’s baseline categories will tend to
deflect attention away from drafters’ substantive underlying understandings or
purposes in favour of a more abstract, formalist account of what lies behind drafters’
constitutional choices. This, in turn, can create a serious risk of both over- and
under-enforcement from the perspective of a constitutional designer seeking to
achieve a particular vision of equality or constitutionalism more generally.
Take a constitution drafter wishing to encourage courts to give broad
effect to an anti-subordination principle under a constitutional equality guarantee.
One approach for such a drafter would be to attempt to enumerate all those
grounds of discrimination that could potentially be used by the government to
undermine the equal standing of groups in society. Another would be to list only
those grounds that, historically, had been the basis of actual systemic disadvantage for
particular groups in the society. The first approach could be expected to produce
a long and symmetric list of grounds common to all modern liberal constitutions,
including race, ethnic origin, colour, tribe, place of origin, gender, sexual
orientation, birth, primary language, social or economic status, age, disability,
creed or religion, and political opinion.149 In contrast, the second approach could
be expected to produce a much shorter, more context-specific, asymmetric list
(such as, in Canada, for instance, one focused on aboriginality; femaleness; new
immigrant, religious or sexual minority status; poverty; old-age; and disability).
The first approach might thus also, intuitively, be seen as more consistent
with a broad approach by courts to the enforcement of the drafter’s vision of
equality. This article argues, however, that the lesson of the SCC’s equality
jurisprudence in this context is that the opposite may in fact be the case: namely,
that at least within the scope of a single guarantee, it is the second, narrower, and more
parsimonious approach, rather than the first broader and more comprehensive
148. One question, which is beyond the scope of this paper to explore, is whether internally
separating or dividing certain guarantees may help alleviate this problem (by, for example,
grouping different express constitutional baselines by distinct underlying purpose).
Subsection 15(1), of course, does not do this and it is clear that mere word ordering will
be insufficient to achieve this. Separate guarantees, however, arguably adhere to the logic of
constitutional design curves by showing that particular provisions cannot be too broad in
coverage without creating dangers of interpretive formalism.
149. Compare e.g. Fiji Islands, Constitution Amendment Act 1997, s 39 (PacLII); Constitution of the
Republic of Uganda 1995, s 21, online: <www.statehouse.go.ug>.
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approach, that will produce the more consistent enforcement of anti-subordination
principles by a court. It will do so by reasoning that, in all cases, pays attention to
those principles, rather than more abstract notions of equality.150 This approach
also seems to conform to a more general principle of constitutional design: after
some tipping point, increasing breadth or specificity in constitutional language
may not always increase long-term control over constitutional outcomes.151 The
reasons for this may vary from one context to the next, and be quite different in
the context of constitutional analogical baselines than in most other contexts.
The phenomenon, however, seems quite widespread, and thus, what seems like
an anomaly in the SCC’s analogical grounds jurisprudence may in fact be part
of a much broader pattern of a distinctly non-linear, inverted “U-shaped”
relationship between specific constitutional design choices and courts’ approach
to constitutional interpretation.152
For this reason alone, if no other, the SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence
also seems worthy of further attention and study by comparative constitutional
lawyers in the years to come.

150. One possibility, for example, is that a constitutional equality clause could be internally
divided to reflect commitments to anti-subordination, anti-stereotyping, and rule of law or
formal individual equality values. See e.g. s 9(1) of the Constitution of South Africa (clearly
delineating formal rule of law and more substantive equality concerns). Such a vision might
also in some ways help relieve pressure on a court, under an anti-subordination guarantee, to
dilute the substantive focus of that guarantee in order to accommodate meritorious claims of
this latter kind.
151. One of the contexts in which this seems true is in the allocation of general, versus specific,
grants of power to one or other level of government in a federal system. See e.g. Rosalind
Dixon, “Constitutional Design Curves” (2012) [working paper, on file with author] [Dixon,
“Constitutional Design”] (discussing Art I of the US Constitution versus s 51 of the Australian
Constitution in this context). I also thank Jamie Cameron for the suggestion that ss 29 and 91
of the Constitution Act (British North America Act) of 1867 may follow this same pattern.
152. See Dixon, “Constitutional Design,” ibid.

